Saving is essential to the health of economies because it provides the wherewithal for investment. In the late nineteenth century, saving was also essential to the health of urban working-class households. This study brings together information from surveys of household spending and saving, reports of savings banks and insurance companies, water and sewer authorities, and health commissioners to illuminate the connections between household savings and health improvements. Contemporary financial institutions positively influenced economic growth by allocating capital to highly productive employments, including public infrastructure. Specifically, investments in waterworks contributed to the long-run decline in typhoid infection, which improved worker health and productivity.
Introduction
Understanding individual thrift is central to understanding long-run economic development because saving is the source of capital, a principal factor of production and one that influences labor productivity and growth. "It is because of this relation between saving and productive capital," writes Modigliani (1986, p. 297) , "that thrift has traditionally been regarded as a virtuous, socially beneficial act." This was certainly the view of early nineteenth-century policy makers who considered individual thrift indispensible not just for long-term development but for personal and civic well-being (Wadwhani 2002) . In the late nineteenth century, individual thrift and personal well-being were more closely connected than hitherto understood.
This study brings together information from a wide variety of sources to trace out the connection between working-class saving and economic growth illustrated in Figure 1 . Using information reported in five surveys of late nineteenthcentury New Jersey industrial workers, this study first documents that about one-half of working-class households saved in a given year and that they saved as much as 12% of their annual incomes. As might be expected in an economy without a strong safety net, households at all income percentiles engaged in net saving, though households dissaved regularly as well, a result consistent with other studies of contemporary working-class households (Alter et al 1994; Wadhwani 2002; Sutch 2011 ). After documenting household saving behaviors, the paper explores how households saved and with which intermediaries. It appears that working-class households were relatively sophisticated savers who spread their savings across available saving vehicles that, in combination, offered alternative combinations of liquidity, risk, and return. Mutual savings banks offered liquidity and low risk (Payne and Davis 1956; Olmstead 1976) ; industrial life insurance companies guaranteed households against the unexpected death of householders (North 1979) ; building and loan associations opened the door to home ownership to urban, working-class households (Bodfish 1931; Snowden 2003) ; and fraternal beneficial societies offered health and life insurance (Beito 2000; Murray 2007 ). One-half or more of these institutions' portfolios were invested in the era's high return, high productivity sectors such as residential housing and railroads, but one-third or more was invested in public-sector capital.
In the 1880s, much of that public-sector investment was directed into what Aschaeur (1989) New and additional municipal investments in local waterworks encouraged the use of publicly supplied water. Once the water systems tapped into relatively pure, water sources, typhoid mortality rates declined markedly. In Newark typhoid mortality declined from an average of 62.2 deaths per 100,000 to 22.2; Jersey City experienced an even more marked decline from 73.6 to 25.1 per 100,000 once its waterworks tapped into a pure water supply. The available evidence from New Jersey does not afford a direct test of the hypothesis, but a number of studies of other places demonstrate a connection between decreased typhoid mortality rates and later-life labor productivity and economic growth (Costa 2000; Ferrie and Troesken 5 2008; Case and Paxson 2009; Beach et al 2016) . Thus, it seems fair to conclude that New Jersey's late nineteenth-century working-class households financed, at least in part, their own health and productivity gains. One contribution of this paper is that it documents this important channel between finance and growth that the now extensive literature has not previously studied (Levine 1997; Bodenhorn 2016) .
Savings mobilization, finance, and development
Financial institutions allocate and invest society's savings, so financial performance has important effects on capital allocation, industrial growth, technological advancement, and economic development (Berger et al 2004) . The now extensive literature exploring the connection between finance and long-run growth argues that financial institutions encourage growth and development because they ameliorate transaction and information costs and facilitate the allocation of resources across space and time in the face of risk and uncertainty (Merton and Bodie 1995) . Financial institutions provide these risk-management services by performing five critical functions: they mobilize savings; allocate savings to alternative investment projects; monitor and exert control over borrowers; reduce savers' risk by holding a diversified portfolio of investments; and facilitate trade through the provision of exchange media (Levine 1997) . Economists argue that better financial institutions -that is, institutions that better identify creditworthy borrowers, better mobilize savings, better pool risk, monitor better, and better facilitate transactions -accelerate economic growth (Levine 1998) . Scores of modern finance-growth studies acknowledge the importance of all five functions, but most follow King and Levine (1993) in their focus on private credit creation and allocation mechanisms, particularly the efficiency with which they allocate capital, encourage entrepreneurial enterprise, and increase total factor productivity growth.
The literature that considers the finance-growth connection in historical contexts follows the modern approach in its focus on the allocation mechanism mediated through the sector's provision of the media of exchange (Rockoff 1975; Lamoreaux 1994; Bodenhorn 2000 Bodenhorn , 2016 Rousseau and Sylla 2005) . It is surprising how little attention has been afforded the mobilization mechanism given the financial sector's ability to mobilize, evidence of which is the relatively high saving 6 and capital formation rates exhibited by nineteenth-century Americans (Gallman 1986 ). Saving mobilization is, therefore, very nearly the "forgotten half" of finance (Adams and Vogel 1986) . Financial institutions not only engage in the four lendingrelated functions; they provide deposit facilities and other repositories for household saving.
Savings mobilization involves creating liquid, small-denomination financial claims on large, indivisible, high-return investments. One hallmark of modern industrial economies is the exploitation of economics of scale and scope, which depends on the agglomeration of capital from dispersed, anonymous, small-scale saver-investors. A second hallmark is the ability of financial intermediaries to attract working-and middle-class savers, even if indirectly, into the market for securities issued by enterprises large enough to exploit available economies. Intermediaries succeed in this to the extent that they can offer secondary or derivative securitieswhether bank deposits, life insurance policies, mutual funds, and so forth -that offer liquidity, maturity, and safety characteristics for a given real return that households find more attractive than primary securities. One of the principal functions is for intermediaries to transfer savings across time and space because any geographical or temporal (maturity) correspondence between savings and investment is purely coincidental (Wilhelm 2001 ). One benefit of intermediation then is that intermediated savings moves toward investment projects that lay outside the reach or experience of savers, who tend to be most comfortable with investments they can see and touch and comprehend (Payne and Davis 1956 Following the flow chart in Figure 1 , the first step is to determine whether Despite the lack of information on age and other characteristics, the surveys contain a wealth of information on the nature of working-class household saving behaviors that have been long neglected (Carter et al 1991) , and shed light on historical household choices. The first issue is whether late nineteenth-century households had the wherewithal to save and, if so, did they. Table 1, The surveys also questioned respondents about household expenses for the past year. In some years the survey asked for total household expenditures; in other years the survey asked respondents to provide detailed budgets on rent, food, clothing, sundries and other expenditures. In a single year, the surveys asked about expenditures on life and sickness insurance, which represent saving rather than current expenditure. Although it will generate a noisy measure, the data can be used to calculate working-class household saving rates.
An approximate household saving rate is then calculated as the difference between household income and expenditure all divided by household income. 2 The implied average saving rate for all five years is 8.1%, but ranges between 4 and 10%.
If adjustments are made to account for underreported homeownership and treat life insurance payments as savings rather than current expenditures, the five-year average is 11.9%.
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The 1883 through 1885 surveys also afford a secondary check on the validity of the estimated saving rates. These three surveys asked simple yes-or-no questions:
"Have you accumulated any savings during the past [current] year?" The responses were coded as 0 (no) or 1 (yes). Approximately 40% reported saving in the past year, and about 50% reported saving in prior years, both of which point to a culture of working-class saving. The simple correlation coefficient between saving in the current year and the estimated saving rate is 0.62 (p-value<0.001). Table 2 provides a two-by-two tabulation of the zero-one response to saving in the current year with a zero-one transform of the estimated saving rate in which positive saving equals one and either zero or negative saving is coded as zero. Although a substantial fraction of workers report that they did not save during the current year and exhibit positive value of income less expenditures, 81.5% of households are on the diagonal, which implies a generally high level of consistency between reported savings and calculated saving rates. Evidence on late nineteenth-century working-class households reveals that their saving behaviors were largely consistent with modern approaches, but the predictions derived from modern theory are consistent with liquidity constraints or imperfections in capital markets (Browning and Lusardi 1996) . The principal capital market imperfection in modern theory is one in which young households prefer to consume more early in life but cannot because capital markets preclude borrowing against future income. Nineteenth-century householders surely faced capital market imperfections in the sense that they found it difficult to smooth consumption by borrowing in youth, repaying loans and saving in middle age, and dissaving in retirement.
Early nineteenth-century households faced a more fundamental market (1888) sheds light on the extent to which working-class households made use of the four principal savings vehicles available to them. In addition to the questions included in earlier surveys, the 1888 survey inquired into whether the head of the household held an account at a savings bank, a building and loan association, whether he or she had a life insurance policy, or belonged to a beneficial society. The 1888 survey also inquired into the amounts held in savings accounts and the amount of insurance, but the response rate to the last two questions was low. Table 4 reports mean and median values for selected statistics related to savings, namely, household incomes, saving rates, amounts held in saving and life insurance accounts, and the fraction of households participating in each type of organization. Mean income among the 1888 respondents was $709; median income was $667. The mean saving rate was 12%; the median rate was 7% for the subsample of 625 respondents. Among the 22 respondents who reported their account balances, the mean savings bank balance was $240, which is close to the average balance calculated from the annual report of New Jersey's (1881) savings banks. The average reported value of life policies was $702, or about seven times the typical industrial life policy and about one-half the amount of the average whole life policy (North 1979) . More than 25% of policies were for $150 or less, which is consistent with what is known about the industrial life industry. While Table 4 illuminates participation rates in each type of saving organization, Schweiger and McGee (1961) contend that, in the mid-twentieth century at least, savings banks had spillover effects. By encouraging one type of thrift, they encouraged complementary saving behaviors. Table 5 reveals that spillovers were modest in the late nineteenth century. Each cell in Table 5 
Institutions, intermediation, and growth
Intermediary private public capital capital core other capital capital
As the subsection of Figure 1 reproduced here reminds us, intermediaries must choose how to allocate the funds savers entrust to them. They might invest in private capital, in public capital, or in some combination of the two. And if they choose to investment in public capital, they must decide between investing in socalled core capital (primarily water, sewer, and other health infrastructure), or other public infrastructure capital (roads, bridges, schools, and so on).
By these criteria beneficial societies and building and loan societies do not qualify as a genuine intermediary. Beneficial societies operated, for philosophical reasons, as close to pay-as-you-go systems as they could. They rarely accumulated more than a minimal reserve fund. Instead, they relied on current premium payments and assessments to meet current claims (New York Insurance Department 1888).
Similarly, building and loan associations were highly specialized financial firms that were required to direct nearly all their resources to the residential mortgages of members (Bodfish 1931; Clark and Chase 1925) . Building and loans served a vital function in a rapidly urbanizing economy (Snowden 2003 ), but they were not traditional intermediaries in the sense that they held diversified portfolios or mortgage and non-mortgage investments of members and nonmembers alike. This raises concerns about savings banks as intermediaries. It is possible that in restricting the banks' assets to mortgages and public debt, regulations might have limited any growth-enhancing intermediation. But the 1880s witnessed significantly increased investments in public infrastructure, notably water and sewer facilities. Table 7 reports the mean and median values for the year in which 94 New Jersey municipalities with pre-1900 water-works completed their systems, the amount invested, and the amount financed through long-term debt issues. The mean year in which these communities constructed a water-works was 1883, at an average total cost of $420,600, of which $339,000 was financed through the issuance of long-term, typically 10-to 30-year, bonds. Cutler and Miller (2006) argue that larger cities operated municipally owned systems, because the capital investments were generally beyond the capacity of private firms, while smaller cities and towns tended to contract with private water companies. New Jersey's municipalities demonstrate the same pattern. The mean municipal system cost five times the mean private system.
In New Jersey, as elsewhere, the ability of municipalities to borrow long term was an important part of the era's push toward clean water, but the evidence concerning the effect of public ownership on water quality relative to private ownership is mixed (Troesken 1999; Troesken and Geddes 2003; Cutler and Miller 2006) . In his history of urban infrastructure, Melosi (2000, p. 75) contends that a city's capacity to construct water-works depended on more than the political will to do so; it relied on "the ability of cities to incur debts," and the capacity of cities to tap financial markets "ultimately made the development of public sanitary systems achievable." Absent the ability to place long-term debt, municipalities found that providing infrastructure "strained available [municipal] resources" to such as extent that "developing adequate water and sewer infrastructure seemed an insurmountable task" (Beemer et al 2005, pp. 49-50) . Mutual savings banks' and industrial life insurance companies' willingness to invest in municipal debt allowed New Jersey's cities to surmount the insurmountable. Newark's Comptroller (1886, p.7) argued that the city's long-term bonds were "sought by investors as safe and reliable securities," which enabled Newark and other cities to place them. But municipalities did not rely on sophisticated financial markets to place them; most issues were too small to interest investment banks. Of Newark's 29 separate water bond issues between 1876 and 1897, 12 were less than $20,000; seven were between $20,000 and $50,000; and five more were for less than $100,000 (Newark Comptroller 1906, p.10) . The city placed its bonds by handing them over to the construction company awarded the contract for the work. savings into investments in water and sewer systems that, in the long run, helped improve urban workers' health and productivity. Now that it has been shown that savings banks and industrial life insurance companies invested substantial amounts in public core capital, the subsection of Figure 1 reproduced here reminds us that the issue arises whether such investments paid off in terms of improvements in public health. The evidence is generally consistent with improved health, but supplying homes with municipally supplied water was not enough if the water was impure.
Between 1860 and 1890 the average daily per capita water consumption in Jersey City doubled. Daily per capita consumption was 52 gallons in 1860, which rose to 98 gallons in 1887 (Jersey City Board of Public Works 1887). Table 9 provides statistics of water usage ( Multiplying taps per capita by four approximates the number of connections per household. As elsewhere in the United States, the provision of water by way of municipal pipes rather than well pumps dramatically increased usage (Melosi 2000) . Cutler and Miller (2006) argue that the political and economic impetus behind the late nineteenth-century push toward the provision of abundant, cheap and clean water lies less in the recognition of the connection between clean water and waterborne diseases, such as cholera, dysentery, and typhoid, than in the ability of cities to tap into expanding and modernizing financial markets. People had long recognized the correlation between impure water and chronic urban diarrheal diseases, as well as the occasional acute outbreak, even if they did not understand the causal mechanism. Late nineteenth-century observers were especially concerned with typhoid, claiming that for every typhoid death avoided three additional premature deaths were avoided. The effect is attributed not the elimination of typhoid per se, which had a relatively low mortality rate among those who contracted the disease, but to the fact that typhoid compromised the immune system. Prior typhoid infection increased the probability of early death from other infections, such as tuberculosis, pneumonia, and influenza (Ferrie and Troesken 2008) . Typhoid death rates for three New Jersey cities in the Passaic River watershed reported in Table 10 reveal that the installation of water and sewer systems alone did not resolve the typhoid problem if the water moving through the system was drawn from rivers contaminated by upstream pollutants. Newark and Jersey City drew their water from the Passaic River, which was known as early as 1887 to be heavily polluted with sewage and industrial wastes dumped by the 25 upstream cities of Paterson and Passaic (Newark Board of Health 1887) . 4 Until 1892 typhoid death rates in Newark remained high and on par with other cities, like
Pittsburgh, that relied on adjacent rivers for city water (Beach et al 2016 in the stock of public capital is associated with a 0.39% increase in total factor productivity growth. The effect of "core" infrastructure, defined as roads, and watersewer investments, is such that a 1% increase in core capital is associated with a 0.24% increase in TFP growth.
Aschauer's (2000) subsequent study takes into account Hulten's (1996) and Barro's (1991) criticisms and still finds that the net effect of debt-financed public infrastructure is positive, significant, and meaningful. His estimates also imply that the optimal public capital-output ratio is about 0.5, but that the mean ratio in 46 lowand middle-income countries is 1.32. It is possible that many modern economies, even low-income ones, have overinvested in public capital. This possibility hardly seems a concern for late nineteenth-century Newark or Jersey City. Overflowing urban privies and muddy streets were common features of most contemporary urban places, and "manifest physical representations of the city's problems" (Cain 1972, p.371) . Citizens agreed to tax assessments to finance sanitary conditions, which benefitted all the city's residents but may have benefitted the working poor relatively more (Troesken 2001 ).
Aschauer's findings have not gone unchallenged, of course, but the weight of the evidence suggests that public capital, even debt-financed public capital, increases private sector growth. Barro (1991) finds it for a sample of 76 countries. Easterly and Rebelo (1993) find it for 100 countries. Nourzad and Vrieze (1995) find the effects in OECD countries. Harchaoui et al (2004) find it in post-1960 Canada. And a metaanalysis of 68 studies (578 separate estimates) suggests a short-run output elasticity to 27 central-government public capital of 0.08 and a long-run elasticity of 0.12. The elasticities of core capital by local and regional governments are nearly double these values (Born and Ligthart 2013) . Alternative approaches also tend to support the productivity enhancing effects of core public capital. Invoking the cost-dual, Morrison and Schwartz (1996) 
